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Abstract—We study the evolution of cooperation using the
Prisoner’s Dilemma as a metaphor of the tensions between
cooperators and non-cooperators, and evolutionary game theory
as the mathematical framework for modeling the cultural
evolutionary dynamics of imitation in a population of unrelated
individuals. We investigate the interplay between network
reciprocity (a mechanism that promotes cooperation in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma by restricting interactions to adjacent sites
in spatial structures or neighbors in social networks) and
conformity (the tendency of imitating common behaviors). We
conﬁrm previous results on the improved levels of cooperation
when both network reciprocity and conformity are present
in the model and evolution is carried on top of degree-
homogeneous graphs, such as rings and grids. However, we also
ﬁnd that scale-free networks are no longer powerful ampliﬁers
of cooperation when fair amounts of conformity are introduced
in the imitation rules of the players. Such weakening of the
cooperation-promoting abilities of scale-free networks is the
result of a less biased ﬂow of information in such topologies,
making hubs more susceptible of being inﬂuenced by less-
connected neighbors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is ubiquitous in nature. From replicating
molecules to humans, individuals cooperate with others even
when such an option represents a cost to themselves. For
this reason, understanding the emergence of cooperation
is a central problem in many ﬁelds of both natural and
social sciences, such as biology, sociology, anthropology and
economics. Researchers of such diverse disciplines have tra-
ditionally adopted the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) as metaphor
for the tension between group welfare and individual self-
ishness, and evolutionary game theory [1], [2] as a common
formal framework for studying both genetic and cultural
evolution.
The PD is a two-person, symmetric game in which players
can be either Cooperators (Cs) or Defectors (Ds). Cs are
willing to engage in cooperative tasks, while Ds prefer not
to, thus exploiting Cs. If two individuals of the same type
interact, they both get the reward for mutual cooperation R
if they cooperate and the punishement for mutual defection
P if they defect. If a D and a C interact, the D receives the
temptation to defect T and the C receives the sucker’s payoff
S. Finally, for the game to be a PD, the pay-offs are ordered
such that T > R > P > S. It is also assumed that 2R >
T+S, thus ensuring that mutual cooperation is preferred over
an equal probability of unilateral cooperation and defection.
Other games serving as metaphors for studying cooperation
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are the Snowdrift game (SD) [3], for which T > R > S > P ,
and the Stag Hunt (SH) [4], for which R > T > P > S.
In evolutionary game-theoretical models, individuals in-
teract, collect pay-offs and reproduce (genetic evolution) or
imitate others (cultural evolution). As a result, the strategy
proﬁle of the population evolves in time. Whenever (i)
the population is inﬁnite, (ii) pairwise interactions are both
anonymous and made at random, and (iii) selection is strictly
pay-off biased, so that ﬁtter individuals reproduce more
(genetic evolution) or individuals have a tendency to imi-
tate successful people (cultural evolution), the evolutionary
dynamics can be analytically predicted by a set of equations
called the replicator dynamics [2]. In the case of the PD,
the only stable equilibrium of the replicator dynamics occurs
when the population is entirely composed of Ds. In other
words, Cs are doomed to extinction whatever their initial
share of the population.
Given such unfavorable predictions for the evolution of
cooperation, several mechanisms have been invoked in order
to explain why altruism can actually evolve [5]. Among
these mechanisms one can cite kin selection [6], group selec-
tion [7], direct reciprocity [8], [9], indirect reciprocity [10]
and network reciprocity [11], [12]. Network reciprocity
emerges in models that correct the assumption of inﬁnite
and well-mixed populations by embedding individuals in
the nodes of networks constraining interactions to some,
but not all, of others [11], [13]. These networks are much
better representations of how actual interactions occur in real
biological and social systems and have been recently studied
in great detail (cf. [14]). When the population of players
possesses such a structure, Cs can survive in clusters of
related individuals for a certain range of the pay-off values, as
it has been evidenced since the pioneering work by Nowak
and May [15]. In particular, scale-free networks [16] have
received a lot of attention, since they have been found to
promote cooperation to a point that Cs dominate Ds over the
entire parameter space of normalized versions of both the
PD and the SD [17].
In addition to the simplifying assumption of inﬁnite, well-
mixed populations, the replicator dynamics also posits that
selection is entirely pay-off biased. Such premise, although
obvious in genetic evolution, is less straightforward to posit
in cultural evolution, where information is transmitted by
means of imitation. Humans not only have a bias for imi-
tating successful people, but also to conform, or to show a
disproportionate tendency to follow the majority [18]. Recent
empirical research has shown not only that conformity is an
important bias in our social learning psychology [19], [20],
but also that it can partially account for the results obtained
in experimental social dilemmas [21], [22]. The introduction
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of conformity in the framework of evolutionary game theory
leads to a modiﬁed replicator dynamics featuring different
equilibrium points from those predicted by the standard set
of equations [23], [24], [25]. Particularly, a PD can become a
SH for some parameter values, so that Cs can resist invasion
from Ds and dominate them if they initially constitute the
majority of the population [25].
It is natural to think of network reciprocity and conformity
as mechanisms that, if simultaneously present in a population
of imitating individuals, would be able to sustain cooperative
behavior in cultural evolution. If (i) people imitate according
to both pay-off and conformist biases, and (ii) interactions
and imitations among individuals are regulated by social
networks imposing a topological structure, conformity and
network reciprocity could reinforce themselves to promote
cooperation beyond the levels predicted when any of the
two mechanisms is absent. However, to date and to the best
of the authors’ knowledge, only few papers have tackled
the study of the interplay between conformity and local
interactions and their effects on the emergence and stability
of cooperation. Bravo [26] explored the outcomes of different
imitation strategies in a spatially structured population. In
his model, unsatisﬁed agents with a pay-off lesser than the
average one in their neighborhoods imitate following either
100% pay-off biased or 100% conformist rules. It was found
that it is pay-off biased imitation the rule that most favors
the spreading of cooperation. In a second study, the ﬁrst
author of this paper showed that, when agents occupy the
nodes of a bidimensional lattice and imitate according to
both pay-off biased and conformist rules, cooperation in
the PD is signiﬁcantly promoted and that the ﬁnal average
fraction of Cs monotonically increases with the amount
of conformity [25]. Finally, using a rigorous mathematical
formalism, Mengel [27] has recently proved that conformity
stabilizes cooperation when agents are arranged in rings and
other simple networks.
In this paper, we extend the results presented in [25]
regarding the intricate interplay between conformity and
network reciprocity in the PD. We show that, depending on
the graph topology, conformity can either further promote or
noticeably hinder the evolution of cooperation as compared
with the baseline models of network reciprocity.
II. MODEL
We focus on the rescaled version of the PD [15], for which
P = S = 0, R = 1 and 1 ≤ T ≤ 2 (the upper bound of 2 for
T is due to due to the 2R > T +S constraint). The resulting
game, actually lying in the boundary between the PD and
the SD games, has been commonly used in the literature and
found to preserve the qualitative properties of the standard
PD when played in networks [15], [17], [28].
We consider a population of N individuals or players,
where the i-th individual is represented by the vertex vi of an
undirected, simple graph G(V,E). The open neighborhood
of i, Γ(i), is the set of all players j such that there is an edge
eij ∈ E. The number of neighbors of i is thus the degree ki
of vertex vi. The closed neighborhood Γ[i] is the set of i’s
neighbours plus i itself.
At each time step, each individual is either a C or a D. The
system evolves by the successive application of interaction
and imitation phases. During the interaction phase, players
simultaneously engage in a single round of the PD with their
neighbors. As a result, individual i collects an accumulated
payoff Πi =
∑
l∈Γ(i) πil, where πil is the pay-off that
player i receives when interacting with player l. During
the imitation phase, each player i randomly chooses one of
its neighbors as its cultural parent and copies its strategy
with a probability φ. Imitation is conformist biased with
probability α and pay-off biased with probability 1−α, where
α is a parameter measuring the amount of conformity in the
individuals’ psychology.
Let us denote i’s cultural parent by j. If imitation is pay-
off biased, φ = φpay−off is monotonically increasing with
the difference in j’s and i’s pay-offs and given by
φpay−off (Πj −Πi) =
{
Πj−Πi
Tk>
if Πj −Πi > 0
0 otherwise
(1)
where k> = max {ki, kj}. Eq. 1 is a local, ﬁnite population
analogue of the replicator dynamics, commonly used in the
literature [17], [3]. If imitation is conformist biased, φ =
φconf is monotonically increasing with the difference in the
proportions of i’s and j’s strategies in the local vicinity of i:
φconf (pij − pii) =
{
pij − pii if pij > pii
0 otherwise
where pil is the proportion of individuals in Γ[i] having
the same strategy as l. Notice that when α = 0 our local
dynamics reduces to the strictly pay-off biased imitation rule
used in previous studies [17], [3].
A. Evolutionary dynamics in inﬁnite, well-mixed populations
In the standard case of a large, well-mixed population,
the time evolution of the fraction of cooperators x for the
simpliﬁed PD can be shown to be given by:
x˙ = x(1− x)
{
1− α
T
[πC − πD] + α(2x− 1)
}
, (2)
where πC = x and πD = xT are the average pay-offs to
Cs and Ds. Eq. 2 (or a similar formula) has been derived
in related work on cultural transmission processes including
both pay-off biased and conformist imitation [21], [23], [25],
[24], [29]. The dynamics has the two trivial ﬁxed points x∗0 =
0 and x∗0 = 1, as well as, if α > (T − 1)/(2T − 1), one
internal non-trivial equilibrium
x∗ =
αT
(1− T ) + α(3T − 1) .
Variations in the amount of conformity can change the sever-
ity of the rescaled PD, leading to two dynamical regions:
1) Dominant defection (α < (T − 1)/(2T − 1)): x∗0 is
the only stable equilibrium. In this case, cooperators
are doomed to extinction regardless of their initial
frequency in the population.
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2) Bi-stability (α > (T−1)/(2T−1)): both x∗0 and x∗1 are
stable whereas the internal ﬁxed point x∗ is unstable.
In this case, the evolutionary dynamics depends on the
initial frequency of Cs, x0. For x0 > x∗ cooperation
prevails, whereas it vanishes for x0 < x∗. Since x∗ >
1/2 ∀α, Cs should be initially the majority in order
to have any chance to prevail. This dynamical region
corresponds to the SH under the standard replicator
dynamics. Thus, the effects of adding conformity to
the PD can be conceptualized as a transformation of
the underlying game to a SH [25].
In sum, conformity can promote cooperation in the PD to
a certain degree in the mean-ﬁeld limit. If in the majority
(and if conformity is strong enough) Cs now have a chance
of surviving invasion from Ds, and eventually take over the
whole population [25]. However, in order for a minority of
Cs to persist, other mechanisms should be also at work. One
such mechanism is network reciprocity.
B. Evolutionary dynamics in ﬁnite, structured populations
The inﬁnite, well-mixed case is important since it is easy
to analyze and it can be described by means of simple
differential equations. However, real populations are both
ﬁnite and structured, so that interactions are constrained to
local neighbors. Games on graphs have been traditionally
carried on the top of degree-homogeneous (or regular) graphs
such as one- and two-dimensional lattices. These graphs
are characterized by a single-peaked degree distribution. In
other words, the number of neighbors is the same for all the
individuals. More recently, several researchers (cf. [30], [17],
[28], [31]) have also studied evolutionary game dynamics
on top of degree-heterogeneous graphs characterized by
broad-scale degree distributions. Particularly, Erdo˝s-Renyi
random graphs [32] (with Poissonian degree distributions)
and Barabasi-Albert networks [16] (with scale-free degree
distributions) have received a lot of attention due to the
beneﬁcial effect of such degree heterogeneity in the evolution
of cooperation [17], [33], [28].
In order to study the interplay between conformity
and network reciprocity on both degree-homogeneous and
degree-heterogeneous population structures, we consider four
different topologies: (i) Rings (regular 1D-lattices with
cyclic boundary conditions), (ii) Grids (regular 2D-lattices
with cyclic boundary conditions), (iii) Erdo˝s-Renyi ran-
dom graphs [32] and (iv) Barabasi-Albert scale-free net-
works [16]. For cases (i), (iii) and (iv) we generated networks
with sizes N = 103, N = 3 × 103 and N = 104, and
average degrees k¯ = 4 and k¯ = 8. The random graphs were
generated using the standard method of independently creat-
ing (k¯ N)/2 edges between pairs of nodes chosen uniformly
at random [32]. With the values of k¯ used in this study,
it is mathematically certain that there is a giant component
in the graph [32]. Besides, we ensure that the whole graph
is connected. The scale-free networks were generated using
the standard Barabasi-Albert growing method starting with
a clique of k¯/2 nodes and then creating k¯/2 edges for each
new node that joins the graph [16]. For grids, we used sizes
of N = 961 (31 × 31), N = 2916 (54 × 54) and N = 104
(100×100) and neighborhoods of the Von Neumann (k¯ = 4)
and Moore (k¯ = 8) types.
Populations where randomly initialized with 50% Cs and
50% Ds. The probability α of using the conformist trans-
mission rule is set to different values between 0 and 0.5 in
steps of 0.1. The temptation to defect T was varied in steps
of 0.05. For each experiment, we carried out 50 runs of 104
steps each, using a fresh graph realization in each run. The
ﬁnal proportions of Cs and Ds were obtained by averaging
over 103 steps after a relaxation time of 104 steps.
III. RESULTS
A. Degree-Homogeneous Graphs
The ﬁnal proportion of Cs obtained on grids and rings of
104 nodes for different amounts of conformity are shown
in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. These plots conﬁrm results previously
obtained both for the α = 0 case (cf. [15], [34], [17]) and
the α > 0 case [25]. Even without conformity, Cs are able to
survive for low values of T by forming clusters within which
they interact more often with their own strategy than what is
expected in mixing populations. Cs can thus greatly beneﬁt
from mutual cooperation and counterbalance the exploitation
of Ds at the borders [34].
As it was already observed in [25] for smaller grids,
conformity enhances cooperation in these regular graphs,
moving the threshold of T for which Cs become extinct
farther to the right. Furthermore, the different curves for
each regular graph are ordered such that the higher the
amount of conformity, the higher the steady-state fraction
of Cs in the population and the larger the value of T
for which defection dominates. Conformity has a positive
effect on regular structures because it helps to promote the
creation of clusters of individuals of the same type. Such
clustering is both favorable for Cs and detrimental for Ds,
since cooperator-cooperator interactions yield higher pay-offs
than defector-defector interactions.
B. Degree-Heterogeneous Graphs
Fig. 3 and 4 show the results obtained for the considered
degree-heterogeneous graphs. These graphs have been found
to enhance cooperation thanks to the colonization of the
more connected nodes by Cs [33]. In particular, scale-free
networks, which are highly degree-heterogeneous, have been
shown to greatly promote the emergence and sustainability
of cooperation [17], [28]. We have conﬁrmed that this is
the case when imitation is strictly pay-off biased, as it can
be seen from the thick curves of Fig. 3 and 4. For random
graphs, Cs are still able to survive for values of T as large as
1.8. The effect of degree-inhomogeneity in the sustainability
of cooperation is much more evident in scale-free networks.
Indeed, for this type of graphs, the proportion of Cs is always
above 0.7 for k¯ = 4 and above 0.35 for k¯ = 8, for all values
of T . When comparing these results to those obtained in
homogeneous graphs, it is clear that degree heterogeneity
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Fig. 1. Final proportion of Cs on a grid with N = 104. (a) k¯ = 4 (Von Neumann). (b) k¯ = 8 (Moore). In each ﬁgure, six different curves are shown,
one for each value of α ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}.
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Fig. 2. Final proportion of Cs on a ring with N = 104. (a) k¯ = 4. (b) k¯ = 8. In each ﬁgure six different curves are shown, one for each value of
α ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}.
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Fig. 3. Final proportion of Cs on random graphs with N = 104. (a) k¯ = 4. (b) k¯ = 8. In each ﬁgure six different curves are shown, one for each value
of α ∈ {0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}.
enhances network reciprocity and, for the case of scale-free
networks, greatly supports cooperative behavior.
When the population is structured according to degree-
heterogeneous graphs, the addition of conformity has some-
what counterintuitive consequences. Only for a scale-free
topology with k¯ = 4 and α ≤ 0.2 does conformity improve
the ﬁnal proportion of Cs beyond what is obtained with
α = 0 for all values of T . In the rest of the cases, conformity
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Fig. 4. Final proportion of Cs on Barabasi-Albert scale-free networks with N = 104. (a) k¯ = 4. (b) k¯ = 8. In each ﬁgure six different curves are shown,
one for each value of α ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}.
does not hamper cooperation for small to medium values of
T but is detrimental for large values of T . Furthermore, the
threshold above which the ﬁnal fraction of Cs is higher than
in the case without conformity seems to be a monotonically
decreasing function of both α and k¯, so that the higher
the amount of conformity and the degree of the graph, the
smaller the level of temptation for which conformity is no
more favorable for Cs as compared to the standard case.
Particularly, for scale-free networks with k¯ = 8 and α ≥ 0.2,
conformity weakens the advantage of scale-free networks in
promoting cooperation. Indeed, for such parameter values,
the ﬁnal fraction of Cs in these highly heterogeneous graphs
is in general not much larger than the corresponding fraction
obtained in grids or rings. For T ≤ 1.4, cooperation is even
better sustained by regular graphs than by scale-free networks
(or random graphs) when α ≥ 0.3.
Apart from the effects on the average level of coopera-
tion, the addition of conformity can also lead to a differ-
ent dynamical organization of cooperation in heterogeneous
graphs. When individuals imitate exclusively according to
a pay-off bias, one observes that Cs and Ds coexist in
quasi-equilibrium, with some nodes ﬁxed in cooperative or
defective behavior and others where there is no ﬁxation
and cycles of invasion follow indeﬁnitely [35]. In this case,
the gradual drop in cooperation seen in the thick curves of
Fig. 3 and 4 is mostly due to ﬂuctuating individuals spending
less and less time engaging in cooperative behavior. Such
dynamical picture changes when individuals not only imitate
according to a pay-off bias, but also follow a conformist
rule. In this case, for k¯ = 8, the population almost always
reaches one of the two absorbing states, so that in the limit
only one strategy gets ﬁxed: Cs for low values of T , Cs
or Ds (with a certain probability) for intermediate values of
T , and Ds for large values of T . In general, and contrary
to what happens without conformity, intermediate levels of
cooperation for the cases with α > 0 are not the result of
the coexistence or ﬂuctuation of different strategies but of
the fact that, for a narrow window of the temptation T ,
the system converges some times to the pure cooperator
state and some times to the pure defector state. Additionally,
evolutionary dynamics develop much faster in the presence
of conformity. Fig. 5 illustrate these observations for the case
of scale-free networks with N = 104, k¯ = 8 and T = 1.35.
Without conformity (Fig. 5(a)) the fraction of Cs for each
run slowly increases until, eventually, it stabilizes around
a value of 0.9 (not shown in the ﬁgure). Conversely, with
α = 0.3 (Fig. 5(b)), very early in the evolutionary process the
population goes either to full cooperation or to full defection.
C. Scaling
Any numerical study must make use of a ﬁnite (and not
excesively large) number of individuals. This causes ﬁnite-
size effects that should be gauged in order to ensure the
statistical signiﬁcance of the obtained results. We have per-
formed numerical simulations for three different population
sizes: N = 103, N = 3 × 103, and N = 104. The ﬁgures
shown in the previous sections referred to the N = 104 case.
Here we show how results change when smaller networks are
used. For reasons of space, we only show the cases of rings
and scale-free graphs with k¯ = 4 and α = 0.0 and 0.5. In the
case of rings (Fig. 6(a)) the curves are almost superimposed
and N = 103 is already sufﬁcient to get stable results. In the
case of scale-free graphs (Fig. 6(b)) the behavior is slightly
noisier but the general trends are maintained for all sizes with
and without conformity. This is expected since regular graphs
do not change their local topology when the graph size is
changed, while in scale-free graphs inter-hub connections are
affected to some extent.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have conﬁrmed that, as it has been suggested by
previous studies [25], [27], conformity further promotes
cooperation when the network regulating interactions and
imitations is a regular graph. In this case, conformity and
network reciprocity reinforce each other, thus favoring the
formation of clusters of individuals of the same type that
allow Cs to maximize their ﬁtness and resist exploitation by
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Fig. 5. Evolution of the proportion of Cs on Barabasi-Albert scale-free graphs with N = 104 during the ﬁrst 500 time steps. In both ﬁgures, T = 1.35.
(a) α = 0.0. (b) α = 0.3. In both ﬁgures 20 distinct curves are shown.
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Fig. 6. Final proportions of Cs for α = 0.0 and α = 0.5 and three different population sizes (N = 103, N = 3 × 103 and N = 104). (a) Rings. (b)
Barabasi-Albert scale-free graphs.
surrounding Ds. Somewhat intriguingly, however, conformity
can also hamper cooperation when evolution is carried on top
of random and scale-free networks. Indeed, for k¯ = 8 and
fair amounts of conformity, these two types of heterogeneous
graphs no longer enhance cooperation as compared to regular
structures. In particular, the highly degree-heterogeneous
scale-free networks lose their abilities to sustain considerable
amounts of cooperation in the PD for the whole spectrum of
T .
To provide an explanation of this phenomenon, let us
ﬁrst review the mechanism responsible for promoting and
sustaining cooperation in degree-heterogeneous graphs in the
absence of conformity. For this, we make use of the notion
of temperature of players as deﬁned in [11]. Hot players
are those who play more since they have a large number
of neighbors, whereas cold players are those who have few
neighbors and, consequently, play less games. By playing
more often, and provided that pay-offs are positively biased
(e.g. S > 0), hot players get higher accumulated payoffs than
cold players. Under pay-off biased transmission, this implies
that hot players are also more successful in being imitated
and in disseminating their strategies. The ﬂow of information
is thus biased in degree-heterogeneous graphs, with strategies
generally spreading from hot to cold players [36].
Let us now consider the PD game. Both Cs and Ds do
better when they are surrounded by Cs. Hot players easily
spread their strategies. By spreading defective behavior, hot
Ds become less and less successful, since the number of their
cooperator neighbors decreases. Hot Cs, on the contrary, see
their pay-off increased by spreading their own cooperative
strategy. The more hot cooperators are imitated the more they
earn and the more difﬁcult for a surrounding D to invade.
A typical example of such “hub dynamics” is illustrated in
Fig. 7(a) for the most connected hub of a Barabasi-Albert
graph. The hub is D at the beginning of the simulation, while
the rest of the population is initialized to around 50% Cs and
50% Ds. Many cooperator neighbors imitate the defective
hub (or other surrounding Ds) during the ﬁrst steps of simula-
tion, so that the proportion of cooperator neighbors is reduced
to approximately 30%. As a consequence, the total pay-off of
the hub is importantly reduced, and the hub becomes vulnera-
ble to invasion from a neighboring C. When the hub becomes
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Fig. 7. Evolution of cooperation around the most connected hub of a Barabasi-Albert scale-free network with N = 104, k¯ = 8 and T = 1.35. The
fraction of cooperator neighbors is shown in solid lines and the strategy of the hub is in dashed lines, so that a value of 0 represents a defective strategy
and a value of 1 a cooperative strategy. As a reference, the level of 50% cooperation among the hub’s neighbors is depicted in dotted lines. The most
connected hub is initially set to D (a) or to C (b). The rest of the population is initialized to around 50% Cs and 50% Ds. (a) α = 0.0. (b) α = 0.1.
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Fig. 8. Evolution of cooperation on a Barabasi-Albert scale-free network with N = 104, k¯ = 8 and T = 1.35. The fraction of Cs in the whole population
is shown in solid lines while the fraction of Cs among the 10 most connected hubs is shown in dotted lines. (a) α = 0.0. (b) α = 0.5.
a C, more and more of its defective neighbors also switch
their strategies. Consequently, the proportion of cooperator
neighbors (and the total pay-off to the hub) increases and
is maintained at a high level afterwards. The presence of
such positive feedback mechanism, and the fact that it only
works for Cs, greatly enhances cooperation in heterogeneous
graphs and, particularly, in scale-free networks [28]. Under
strict pay-off biased imitation, cooperator hubs ‘guide’ the
evolution of cooperation in the rest of the population, as it
is shown in Fig. 8(a).
The introduction of conformity decreases the bias in the
ﬂow of information in heterogeneous graphs, making hubs
vulnerable to invasion from their cold neighbors. While hubs
are unlikely to imitate their low connected neighbors when
using a pay-off biased rule, nothing prevents them from imi-
tating a cold surrounding player if it holds the strategy of the
local majority. Since the fraction of Cs generally decreases
at the outset of the simulation (see the ﬁrst time steps of
the curves shown in Fig. 5), conformity further favors Ds,
which become predominant in the population. An example
of this dynamics is shown in Fig. 7(b). Initially, the hub is a
C. Many of the hub’s neighbors turn to defection during the
ﬁrst time steps, making cooperation the less common strategy
in the hub’s neighborhood. Around the 100th time step, the
hub imitates by conformity one of its defector neighbors,
leading to a quicker decrease in the proportion of cooperation
in its neighborhood. Shortly after, Cs completely vanish
around the most connected hub. During those ﬁrst time steps,
hubs imitating according to a conformist bias will have high
chances of becoming defectors. Such initial asymmetry in
the strategies of the hubs can account for the negative effects
of conformity in the evolution of cooperation on scale-free
networks. Indeed, as it has been discussed elsewhere [37], Cs
go easily extinct when the initial distribution of strategies is
biased so that Ds have higher chances of occupying highly
connected nodes. Conformity partly reverses the ﬂow of
information on degree-heterogeneous networks so that hubs
no longer take the lead of the dynamics and instead conform
to the general trend of the whole population (see Fig. 8(b)).
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The presented results and analyses conﬁrm that conformity
and network reciprocity, when acting independently on the
framework of evolutionary game theory, are able to promote
cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma beyond
the limits of the standard replicator dynamics. However,
when they are simultaneously present, they do not always
reinforce their cooperation-promoting abilities, as it could
be naively expected. Indeed, whether conformity strengthens
or weakens the evolution of cooperation depends on the
intrinsic characteristics of the underlying graph. Conformity
favors cooperation when evolution is carried out on degree-
homogeneous graphs for the whole range of the temptation
to defect T . Conversely, it can hinder cooperation in degree-
heterogeneous graphs for medium to large values of T . In
particular, for fair amounts of conformity, scale-free networks
with relatively small mean degrees do not show the great
improvement over regular structures that has been previously
reported in the literature.
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